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COMMENTS ON JUDGE ODA'S APPROACH TO THE COMMON
HERITAGE OF MANKIND
G. WINTHROP HAIGHT*

In Part V of his paper, Judge Oda deals with the problem, facing
the international community, of how the marine resources of one-third
of the globe should be treated under international law.' Although
Judge Oda deals with both the mineral resources lying beyond the continental margins and the living resources in the waters beyond the exclusive economic zones, the following comments deal only with the
former.
Judge Oda says that, with respect to mineral resources, "the concept of the common heritage of mankind is now being suggested" as
the basis for building a deep seabed regime.' After tracing the history
of this characterization, including the 1970 declaration by the U.N.
General Assembly,' he asks whether this concept produces a solution
for the problem before the Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS III).
He suggests that it does not, the words by themselves being "pious but
empty."'4 In general, he reports that efforts so far to reach agreement
on seabed mining issues have "run onto the rocks." 5
Even the most superficial observer must admit that the Conference is in serious danger. Nevertheless, present indications are that the
United States will make a determined effort during the session of
March/April 1982 to negotiate amendments to the current text6 that
will meet current concerns. Such concerns were indicated in general
terms in August, 1980 at the Tenth Session of the Conference in Geneva, during informal meetings and discussions with Third World
(Group of Seventy-Seven) representatives' and others.
*Of counsel, Decker Hubbard & Welden, New York City. A.B., Yale College, 1928;
LL.B., Yale Law School, 1931.
1. Oda, Sharing of Ocean Resources - Unresolved Issues in the Law of the Sea, 3
N.Y.J. INT'L & Comp. L. 1 (1981).
2. Id. at 9.
3. G. A. Res. 2749, 2750, 13 U.N. GAOR Series 1 (1970-1971). Resolution 2750 contains the following phrase: "Reaffirming that the area of the sea-bed and the ocean floor,
and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, and its resources are
the common heritage of mankind ....
Id.
4. Oda, supra note 1, at 13.
5. Id. at 9.
6. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Draft Convention of the
Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/L.78 (1981) (hereinafter cited as Draft
Convention].
7. The Group of Seventy-Seven is a block of Latin American, Asian, and African
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The stage has been passed at the Conference where the need for
an elaborate organizational structure can be questioned. It would be
difficult, in any case, for the United States to insist on unraveling an
organization constructed along the lines proposed by it in 1970. The
draft treaty then submitted by the United States, however, limited the
functions of the "Authority" to the licensing of qualified mining applicants on a first-come, first-served basis.6 This limited role was emphatically rejected by the Group of Seventy-Seven in Caracas in 1974. 9
Since then, the Conference has attempted, year after year, to find some
way of accommodating the needs of the Developed Countries for access
to the "common heritage" with a minimum of red tape, and the desire
of the Group of Seventy-Seven delegations to maximize control by the
Authority and to ensure exploitation by its operating arm - the Enterprise. The "parallel system,"' which is designed to satisfy both points
of view, is still dependent for its success on the proper exercise by the
Authority of its broad discretionary powers. The scope of these powers
and the limited role that the United States might be able to play in
their exercise are currently the cause of great concern.
Such concern cannot be met by merely providing the United
states that banded together in order to more effectively promote their interests as developing countries. Although originally consisting of some seventy-five nations at the 1963
General Assembly, it was not until the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva, and the issuance of the Joint Declaration of the
Seventy-Seven Developing Countries, that they emerged as a consolidated political
force. See generally Friedman & Williams, The Group of 77 at the United Nations: An
Emergent Force in the Law of the Seas, 16 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 555-74 (1979).
8. United States Draft of U.N. Convention on International Seabed Area, 9 I.L.M.
1046 (1970).
9. Several Third-World countries made speeches delineating their opposition to the
United States' proposed limitation on the Authority's functions. See T. KRONMILLER,
THz LAWFULNESS Or DxEP SPABED MINING 54 (1980). "The international authority, in the
Tanzanian view, would have to 'control' deep seabed activities and to exploit the resources itself. Otherwise, mankind would be 'disinherited' by the technologically advanced States." Id. at 54. Peru stated:
The ideas of international social property, service rather than profit, a
cooperative system, full-participation by all States, and democratic management
and control constituted the firmest guarantee that the common heritage of mankind would really benefit all peoples ....
Id.
10. See generally Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea: The Ninth Session, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 211 (1981). The parallel system provides the
opportunity to State-sponsored private companies and the new international Enterprise
to mine the deep seabeds on a somewhat comparable basis. A private applicant must
propose two sites, one of which is to be reserved for use by the Enterprise or developing
countries. Additionally, the Enterprise has the right to obtain mining technology on reasonable commercial terms from the private companies. The resulting agreement is
designed to balance the interests of developed countries and private companies against
the ambitions of the developing countries and the Enterprise. Id. at 214.
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States with a guaranteed seat on the Council." The outcry against
guarantees for the Soviet bloc has been a red herring that has diverted
attention from the substance of voting problems in international organizations. The efforts to protect American interests against large voting
majorities have led to the requirement in the Draft Treaty that certain
key issues shall require a consensus for their adoption and others a
three-quarters vote." But the list of consensus items is far too short
and the three-fourths vote requirement woefully inadequate in a world
of 160 nations in which the United States and its allies number less
than ten percent. This is a problem that exists in many other international areas and calls for a solution that avoids the unpopular veto,
while adequately protecting minority interests. At the same time, the
United States may frequently wish to obtain support for affirmative
action. There may, therefore, be situations where too large a measure
of protection for minority interests may be undesirable.
These structural difficulties obscure the basic problems of deep
seabed nodule mining. It has been assumed that the enormous nodule
mineral wealth lying at great depths in the Pacific and elsewhere could
readily be brought to the surface. Exploratory work so far undertaken
by five consortia in this country and Europe indicates tremendous difficulties and capital outlays in translating nodule contents on the ocean
floor into marketable metals. How long the process might take cannot
be determined at this stage, particularly in view of current political
uncertainties. What is clear is that, if further progress is to be made at
all, pioneer developers must be protected with regard to the investments already made and the huge outlays that lie ahead. At this writing, there are prospects of obtaining mining rights under legislation in
force in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States
which will be recognized on a reciprocal basis by these States. 8 The
next stage is for such rights to be translated into contracts with the
Authority once the treaty enters into force. As that event is likely to be
many years in the future, an immediate concern is the negotiation of
firm rights with the Preparatory Commission that will be established
by the Conference to deal with transitional matters such as the drafting of provisional mining rules and regulations that would operate un11. The Council consists of thirty-six members of the Authority elected by the Assembly. The election is carried out by a five-step process. The bases on which the seats
are filled, in order of priority, are: 1) size of investment; 2) consumption; 3) production;

4) special interests; and 5) equitable distribution of seats. See Draft Convention, supra
note 6, art. 161.
12. Id. art. 161(7)(c).
13. See Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-283, § 118,
94 Stat. 553 (1980) (to be codified in 30 U.S.C. § 1428); Collins, Deep Seabed Hard
Mineral Resources Act - Matrix for United States Deep Seabed Mining, 13 NAT. RESOURcES LAw. 571, 580 (1981).
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til their formal adoption by the Council and Assembly."'
Firm contracts would not, however, be sufficient in view of the
complex provisions of the Draft Treaty for the limitation of nickel production to a percentage of the growth rate in the annual consumption
of nickel."5 Pioneer developers would at least have to be assured of production authorizations under the ceiling in effect, when the treaty enters into force. The question arises, however, why production should be
limited at all in view of growing world demand for the metals involved,
notably cobalt and nickel. The answer lies, unfortunately, in the resistance of States in which the metals are produced and exported in significant quantities. These land-based producers, ably led by Canada,
have succeeded in imposing major limitations on seabed production
and, in effect, establishing an antiproduction treaty. Not only must
pro-production policies be written into the treaty, but the production
limitation itself must either be scrapped, or its negative effect drastically limited.
Another area of negotiation will concern changes in the provisions
for mandatory transfers of technology. Technology is defined as "the
specialized equipment and technical know-how ...necessary to assemble, maintain and operate a viable system."" This definition contains
three elements: (a) specialized equipment (i.e. hardware); (b) technical
know-how; and (c) the stated objective of assembling, maintaining and
operating "a viable system." Apart from the extremely broad nature of
the definition, it might imply a guarantee that a particular system, still
in a pioneer pre-prototype stage, will be workable or "viable" at any
point in its development. No pioneer operator at the present time
could provide any such guarantee. Nor would it be easy to identify either the equipment or the know-how, when both are rapidly changing,
sometimes evolving, sometimes being discarded. In any case, it would
be the intention to make the hardware itself available, such as the mining vessel, the miner itself, miles of pipe and wiring and so on. What
must surely be intended is a license of software necessary to enable the
licensee to build its own system through the construction and purchase
of equipment. There cannot, however, be guarantees as to viability.
And there must be provisions for the protection of proprietary data
and for compensation where such data is disclosed contrary to the
terms on which it was licensed. Other changes will be necessary, including the provision for an undertaking that third-party suppliers
provide assurances that they will supply what they have provided to
contractors with the Authority. The most that should be expected of
such contractors is that they make good faith efforts to obtain assur14.
15.
16.

See generally DEEPSEA MINING (J.T. Kildow ed. 1980).
Draft Convention, supra note 6, art. 151.
Id. Annex III, art. 5(8).
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ances where these cannot be directly obtained by the Enterprise.
Another outstanding difficulty with the present Draft Convention
provision for a review conference fifteen years after the year in
the
is
which the earliest commercial production commences, where it would
be possible to amend the system of exploration and exploitation by the
vote and ratification of two-thirds of the States parties.' 7 If such a provision were retained, changes in the system could be imposed on the
United States and other non-consenting States without ratification by
them. The only defense against such imposition would be withdrawal
from the treaty regime. Where would this leave nodule mining? It has
always been the aim of the Group of Seventy-Seven to establish a unitary system of mining under the Authority and through the Enterprise
once the necessary financing and technology has been obtained. While
mining operations at the time a new system was adopted could continue under existing contracts, future operations would be conducted
by the Enterprise or pursuant to joint venture, service or other contracts with the Enterprise. Presumably, a major effort will be made by
the United States at the Conference to alter the provisions for review
and amendment in order to protect the rights of non-consenting
States.
Other changes in the treaty are necessary in order to protect minority and private enterprise rights. These include provisions for the
arbitration of claims where the Legal and Technical Commission has
improperly failed to recommend applications by qualified applicants
for approval' s and provisions containing prohibitions against changes
1
in rules and regulations that alter essential rights set out in contracts. 9
These negotiations, if they take place, will make some contribution
toward finding a meaning for the "common heritage of mankind." Nevertheless, the "high level of responsibility or harmony" 0 to which
Judge Oda refers, as necessary for a common understanding of the concept, may still have eluded the international community. Access under
the treaty would always require the approval of an international organization, and this is perceived as a major hazard where the organization
is managed and controlled by developing countries dedicated to state
enterprise and a new international economic order. Although the treaty
text aspires to a high degree of automaticity in the granting of mining
contracts, there is inevitably a measure of discretion available to administrators even where allocations or selections are not compelled by
17. Id. art. 151(2)(b).
18. Id. art. 165 and Annex III, art. 6.
19. Id. art. 153(6) and Annex III, art. 4(6). The question here is whether the applicant's undertaking to be bound by rules and regulations commits it to changes that impair the fundamental relationship between the applicant and the Authority.
20. Oda, supra note 1, at 14.

20
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the production ceiling or anti-density provisions. This discretion could
take the form of delaying the processing of applications in conducting
investigations, calling for detailed reports and otherwise harassing
those applicants whose submissions are politically unacceptable. There
are safeguards in the availability of dispute settlement provisions
where charges of "misuse of power" are raised, but the tribunals themselves might be uncertain quantities where the good faith of the Authority is in issue.
Nevertheless, legal powers are being established for the protection
of individual rights. It is possible that the existence of these processes,
as well as the terms of the treaty itself and the exercise of efficient,
impartial administration, will in time develop the common understanding that Judge Oda considers necessary if the concept of the "common
heritage of mankind" is to play a significant role in sharing the benefit
of ocean resources as well as the sacrifices and burdens of economic
development.

